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Abstract—Bitcoin-NG (Next Generation), a scalable blockchain
protocol, divides each block into a key block and many micro
blocks to effectively improve the transaction processing capacity.
Bitcoin-NG has a special incentive mechanism (i.e. splitting trans-
action fees to the current and the next leader) to maintain its se-
curity. However, this incentive mechanism ignores the joint effect
of transaction fees, mint coins and mining duration lengths on the
expected mining reward. In this paper, we identify the advanced
mining attack that deliberately ignores micro blocks to enlarge
the mining-duration length to increase the likelihood of winning
the mining race. We first show that an advanced mining attacker
can maximize its expected reward by optimizing its mining-
duration length. We then formulate a game-theoretical model
in which multiple mining players perform advanced mining to
compete with each other. We analyze the Nash equilibrium for
the mining game. Our analytical and simulation results indicate
that all mining players in the mining game converge to having
advanced mining at the equilibrium and have no incentives
for deviating from the equilibrium; the transaction processing
capability of Bitcoin-NG at the equilibrium is decreased by
advanced mining. Therefore, we conclude that the Bitcoin-NG
blockchain protocol is vulnerable to advanced mining.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Bitcoin-NG, Incentive mechanism,
mining strategy, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
B ITCOIN [1] the first successful decentralized digitalcryptocurrency, has gained much recognition and support
from people in various fields. It has become the 11th largest
currency in the world, with a market capitalization of over
0.21 trillion US dollars as of August 2019. As the foundation
technology for Bitcoin, blockchain is a decentralized and
distributed digital ledger that stores data in chronological
order in a way that the data in the chain cannot be falsified.
Blockchain has become a cutting-edge technology in the fields
of FinTech [2], Internet of Things (IoT) [3], [4], and supply
chains [5], thanks to its ability to enable Byzantine agreement
over a permissionless decentralized network [6].
Despite its strong security and privacy protection, Bitcoin
blockchain faces a significant scalability problem, i.e., the
speed at which it can handle transactions is restricted by the
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block size and block interval [7]–[9]. In Bitcoin blockchain
network, miners devote computational powers to solve a hash
puzzle in each round. The miner who has successfully solved
the hash puzzle becomes the leader for that round and broad-
casts a block that contains transactions to the whole network.
For the current Bitcoin blockchain protocol, the maximum size
of each block is set to 2 MB and the average interval between
two successive blocks is fixed to 10 minutes, which means
that Bitcoin blockchain can only handle up to 8 Transactions
Per Second (TPS), given a typical transaction size of 250
Bytes. This TPS is a very low transaction processing capacity,
compared to the average 2000 TPS of Visa global payment
system.
In order to improve its on-chain transaction processing
capacity, Bitcoin blockchain could simply increase the block
size or reduce the block interval. However, increasing the
block size (by packing more transactions into each block) and
reducing the block interval (by decreasing the difficulty of
hash puzzles) both lead to more forks on blockchain, which
compromises the security of blockchain. Without redesigning
the blockchain protocol, it is hard to increase the transaction
processing capacity of Bitcoin blockchain by simply tuning
these protocol parameters.
To solve the scalability problem of Bitcoin blockchain,
many new blockchain protocols have been proposed. For the
detail discussions about the existing blockchain protocols,
we refer the interested reader to the surveys [10], [11] and
the references therein. Among these blockchain protocols,
Bitcoin-NG (Next Generation) [12] blockchain has attracted
much attention, thanks to its effectiveness in solving the
blockchain scalability problem and its compatibility with the
current Bitcoin blockchain protocol [12]. To achieve a large
transaction processing capacity, Bitcoin-NG decouples each
block into two types of blocks: a key block and a number of
micro blocks. The key block is used to elect the leader for
this round. The micro blocks are used to record transactions
onto the blockchain. According to the Bitcoin-NG blockchain
protocol, the first miner that correctly solves the current hash
puzzle can create a new key block and becomes the leader
for the current round. After placing the new key block on
top of the previous block, the leader is in charge of packing
transactions into the following micro blocks. The creation of
micro blocks does not require the mining process of solving
hash puzzles. Bitcoin-NG blockchain can achieve very fast
transaction processing speed, since transactions are packaged
into micro blocks that are released much faster than key
blocks.
2The incentive mechanism of Bitcoin-NG is different from
that of Bitcoin in which all transaction fees are allocated to
the leader of the current round. In Bitcoin-NG blockchain,
the incentive mechanism distributes a part of the transaction
fees contained in the micro blocks to the leader of the current
round and the remaining part of the transaction fees to the
leader of the next round [12]. With this special incentive mech-
anism, Bitcoin-NG blockchain encourages miners to behavior
honestly, i.e., to follow the default behaviors of extending
the heaviest chain, including transactions, and extending the
longest chain [12]. The Bitcoin-NG blockchain protocol can
significantly improve the transaction processing capacity of
blockchain networks. However, we point out that Bitcoin-
NG blockchain is vulnerable to advanced mining attack that
compromises its security. Advanced mining attack refers to the
mining behavior in which miners ignore some micro blocks
issued by the leader of the current round and intentionally
mine the next key block in advance to enlarge their lengths of
mining duration (see details in Section IV). Although mining
in advance will earn less transaction fees (since it ignores and
discards some micro blocks), it will increase the probability
of mining success and thus increases the rewards from the
mint coins contained in key blocks. Therefore, there is still
a motivation for miners to perform advanced mining attack.
Without considering the joint effect of mining-duration length,
mint coins contained in key blocks, transaction fees contained
in micro blocks, the original design of Bitcoin-NG blockchain
[12] is not robust against advanced mining attack.
In this paper, we conduct a thoughtful analysis of the
advanced mining behavior for the Bitcoin-NG blockchain pro-
tocol, by taking all the relevant factors (i.e., transaction fees,
mint coins, mining time lengths) into account. Specifically, we
have the following three contributions.
• First, we analyze the scenario where an attacker can mine
the next key block in advance, while other miners in the
network follow honest mining. We use this scenario to
explain what is the advanced mining attack and why it
is more profitable. We formulate the attacker’s mining
problem as an optimization problem that aims to max-
imize the expected mining reward with respect to the
length of mining duration. We find the optimal length
of mining duration to get the maximum expected reward.
Our results show that the attacker can indeed gain more
rewards under the optimal advanced mining strategy than
honest miners do.
• Second, we proceed to analyze the scenario where the
whole Bitcoin-NG blockchain network is divided into two
mining pools, and both mining pools can adopt advanced
mining. The analysis gets different as each pool’s revenue
is affected by the mining-duration length of the other.
We then formulate the mining process of the two-pool
scenario as a two-player game. We analytically find the
Nash equilibrium for this two-player mining game. We
further extend the two-player game to an N -player game
that models the general scenario of N > 2 mining pools.
We find that there always exist a Nash equilibrium for
this N -player game, although its analytical result is hard
to derive.
• Third, we perform numerical computations and system
simulations to investigate and verify our analytical results.
For different computing power profiles, we numerically
compute the optimal mining lengths and corresponding
maximum expected rewards of the attacker’s mining
optimization problem; we numerically compute the equi-
librium points of the mining game. We also construct a
Bitcoin-NG simulator to investigate the advanced mining
problem. We simulated 210 miners mining at identical
rates that are divided into two and three mining pools
who perform advanced mining to compete with each
other. Our numerical and simulation results confirm our
analytical results and suggest how to alleviate the negative
effect of advanced mining for the Bitcoin-NG blockchain
protocol.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives a blockchain preliminary. Section III reviews the Bitcoin-
NG blockchain protocol. Section IV presents our analysis for
the advanced mining problem. Section V provides numerical
and simulation results and Section IV concludes this paper.
II. BLOCKCHAIN PRELIMINARY
Blockchain is first proposed as the decentralized append-
only ledger for the crypto-currency, Bitcoin. The data of
blockchain is replicated and shared among all participants. Its
past recorded data are tamper-resistant and participants can
only append new data to the tail-end of the chain of blocks.
The state of blockchain is changed according to transactions
issued by the payers. Specifically, the issued transactions are
broadcasted over the blockchain network. Participants then
collect and group these transactions into blocks and append
them to the blockchain. Each block contains a header and a set
of transactions. The header of the block encapsulates the hash
of the preceding block, the hash of this block, the merkle root
of all transactions contained in this block, and a number called
nonce that is generated according to the consensus protocol of
Proof-of-Work (PoW) [1]. Since each block must refer to its
preceding block by placing the hash of its preceding block in
its header, the sequence of blocks then forms a chain arranged
in a chronological order. Fig. 1 illustrates the data structure of
Bitcoin blockchain.
A. Proof of Work and Mining
Bitcoin blockchain adopts the PoW consensus protocol to
validate new blocks in a decentralized manner. In each round,
the PoW protocol selects a leader that is responsible for
packing transactions into a block and appends this block
to blockchain. To prevent adversaries from monopolizing
blockchain, the leader selection must be approximately ran-
dom. Since blockchain is permissionless and anonymity is
inherently designed as a goal of blockchain, it must consider
the sybil attack where an adversary simply creates many
participants with different identities to increase its probability
of being selected as the leader. To address the above issues,
the key idea behind PoW is that a participant will be randomly
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Fig. 1: Illustration for the data structure of Bitcoin blockchain.
selected as the leader of each round with a probability in
proportion to its computing power.
In particular, blockchain implements PoW using computa-
tional hash puzzles. To create a new block, the nonce placed
into the header of the block must be a solution to the hash
puzzle expressed by the following inequality [10]:
bh = H (x ‖nonce) ≤ T (d) (1)
where x denotes the binary string assembled using the candi-
date block data including the Merkle root of all transactions,
the hash of the previous block, etc., nonce denotes the solution
string of the nonce, H (·) is the cryptographic hash function,
bh is the hash of the candidate block and it is a bit stream
of length L, T (d) = 2L−d is a target value, d is the current
difficulty level of the hash puzzle (i.e., the number of leading
zeros in the hash of a valid candidate block). Using the
blockchain terminology, the process of computing hashes to
find a nonce is called mining, and the participants involved
are called miners.
With a difficult level d and the corresponding target T (d) =
2L−d in (1), each single query to the PoW puzzle expressed
in (1) is an i.i.d. Bernoulli test whose success probability is
given by
Pr (y : H (x ‖y) ≤ T (d)) =
T (d)
2L
= 2−d (2)
When d is very large, the above success probability of a single
query is very tiny. Moreover, it is known that with a secure
hash algorithm (e.g., the SHA-256 hash used for Bitcoin),
the only way to solve (1) is to query a large number of
nonces one by one to check if (1) is fulfilled until one lucky
nonce is found (i.e., to exhaustively search for the nonce).
Therefore, the probability of finding such nonce is proportional
to the computing power of the participant—the faster the hash
function in (1) can be computed in each trial, the more number
of nonces can be tried per unit time.
Miners need to compute hash queries as fast as possible
to win the race of mining, which is a very computationally
intensive task. Let wn denote the number of hash queries that
miner n can compute per unit time, i.e., wn is the hash rate of
miner n. Then, the number of success queries that miner n can
make converges to a Poisson process with rate λn
∆
= wn/2
d
[10]. Moreover, the computation time between two successful
queries made by miner n (represented by a random variable
Xn) fulfills the exponential distribution with rate λn [10].
Thus, the probability that at least one successful query made
by miner n within the duration of length t is given by
Pr (Xn < t) = 1− e
−wn
2d
t
(3)
which is proportional to the hash rate wn and the mining-
duration length t. It is evident from (3) that more computation
power (faster hash rate) and more computation time (longer
mining duration) lead to larger probability of successful min-
ing.
Consider there are totally N miners in the network and
each performs mining to solve the PoW puzzle independently.
Since the combination of the N independent Poisson processes
is still a Poisson process with a rate obtained by summing up
the rates of the N independent Poisson processes [13], the
number of success queries per unit time made by the whole
network is a Poisson processes with rate
λ =
∑N
n=1
λn =
1
2d
∑N
n=1
wn (4)
which is also the expectation of the successful queries made
by the whole network per unit time. Therefore, the average
number of blocks mined during the given block interval T is
λT = (T/2d)
∑N
n=1 wn. The difficulty control of blockchain
aims at fixing the average number of the mined blocks per
block interval T to one by adjusting the difficulty level d to
adapt to the fluctuations in the total computation power of the
network [14].
B. Honest Mining Strategy
When a miner tries to append a new block to the latest legal
block by placing the hash of the latest block in the header of
the new block, we say that the miner mines on the latest block.
Bitcoin blockchain is maintained by miners in the following
manner.
To encourage all miners to mine on (maintain) the current
blockchain, each legal block distributes a reward to the miner
as incentives. The reward of each block consists of two parts.
The first part of the reward is a certain amount of new coins.
When a miner mines a new block, the miner is allowed to
place a coin-mint transaction in its mined block that credits
this miner with some new coins as a part of the reward. The
other part of the reward is the transaction fees contained in
the transactions packaged in the block. If the block is verified
and accepted by the blockchain network (i.e., it becomes a
legal block), the reward is effective and thus can be spent on
the blockchain. When a miner has found an eligible nonce, it
publishes his block to the whole blockchain network. Other
miners then verify the nonce and verify the transactions
contained in that block. If the verification of the block is
passed, other miners will mine on the block; otherwise, other
miners discard the block and will continue to mine on the
previous legal block.
If two miners publish two different legal blocks that refer
to the same preceding block at the same time, the blockchain
is then forked into two branches. This is called forking of the
blockchain. Forking is an undesirable feature of blockchain,
since it threatens the security of blockchain [9]. To resolve
4forking, PoW prescribes that only the rewards of blocks
on the longest branch (called the main chain) are effective.
Then, miners are incentivized to mine on the longest branch,
i.e., miners always add new blocks after the last block on
the longest main chain that is observed from their local
perspectives. If the forked branches are of equal length, miners
may mine subsequent blocks on either branch randomly. This
is referred to as the rule of longest chain extension.
The mining strategy of adhering to the rule of longest chain
extension and publishing a block immediately after the block
is mined is referred to as the honest mining strategy [10].
The miners that comply with honest mining are called honest
miners. It was widely believed that the most profitable mining
strategy for miners is the honest mining strategy; and that
when all miners adopt the honest mining strategy, each miner
is rewarded proportionally to the ratio of its computing power
to the total computing power all miners [10]. As a result, any
rational miner will not deviate from honest mining. This belief
was later shown to be ill-founded for Bitcoin blockchain and
that other mining strategies with higher profits are possible,
such as selfish mining [15], withholding mining [16], etc.
To restrain forks on blockchain that will threaten the secu-
rity, the generation rate of key blocks cannot be too small and
the block size cannot too large [7]. Therefore, the drawback
of Bitcoin blockchain—its low TPS throughput—cannot be
solved by just shortening the inter-block interval and inserting
more transactions into each block.
III. BITCOIN-NG BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOL
Compared with Bitcoin, Bitcoin-NG is a scalable blockchain
protocol that allows for greater TPS throughputs without
inducing extra communication latency. To separate the func-
tionalities of selecting leaders (using PoW) and recording
transactions, the Bitcoin-NG blockchain protocol introduces
two types of blocks: key blocks and micro blocks. Bitcoins
block and Bitcoin-NGs key block have the same effectiveness
expect that the latter contains no transactions. In Bitcoin-NG,
the first miner that correctly solves the current hash puzzle
creates a new key block and becomes the leader for the current
round. After placing the new key block on the previous block,
the leader is in charge of packing transactions into micro
blocks. Intuitively, the Bitcoin-NG protocol divides a Bitcoin
block into the key block and the micro block to achieve TPS
throughput improvement.
A. Key Blocks and Micro Blocks
Fig. 2 illustrates the data structure of Bitcoin-NG
blockchain. In each round (e.g., the i-th round), once a miner
who finds a correct nonce to solve the PoW problem, this
miner becomes the new leader and immediately creates a
new key block Ki. Unlike the block of Bitcoin, this key
block contains no transactions. It still contains the hash of
the preceding block, the hash of this block, the nonce, a coin-
base transaction to pay out the reward; moreover, it contains
an extra public key. This public key must match the private
key contained in the subsequent micro blocks.
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Fig. 2: Illustration for the data structure of Bitcoin-NG
blockchain. A key block (the square) is followed with a set of
micro blocks (the circle). Transaction fees are divided into two
parts: α for the current leader and 1− α for the next leader.
After the key block, the miner generates many consecutive
micro blocks, {Mi,1,Mi,2, · · · ,Mi,j , · · ·}, that are used to
pack transactions. Unlike the key block, the generation of
these micro blocks does not need PoW. Thus, the leader
can generate consecutive micro blocks quickly without extra
computational overhead until the next key block is published.
The header of each micro block encapsulates the hash of the
preceding block, the Unix time, the hash of ledger entries
and a signature of the header. The signature is signed with
the private key that matches the public key contained in the
key block Ki. By packing many transactions into each micro
block and publishing micro blocks in a relatively high rate,
Bitcoin-NG is allowed to achieve very high TPS throughputs
[12]. In [9], it is also theoretically analyzed that Bitcoin-NG-
like protocols, which decouple the functionalities of leader
selection and transaction recording into different types of
blocks, can achieve the optimal transaction processing capacity
of the network.
B. Incentives
Bitcoin-NG employs its specially designed incentive mech-
anism to motivate rational miners to follow the three honest
actions: i) extending the heaviest chain; ii) extending the
longest chain; iii) including transactions into the micro blocks.
Heaviest chain extension: Assuming a majority of min-
ers in the network are honest, Bitcoin-NG is designed to
incentivize miners to always extend the heaviest chain that
contains the largest amount of proof-of-work. In Bitcoin, the
heaviest chain is the longest chain, since each block (that
contains proof-of-work) is given a weight. In Bitcoin-NG,
only key blocks are given weights and micro blocks are
given no weight (since micro blocks contain no proof-of-
work). Without assigning weights to micro blocks, Bitcoin-
NG does not increase the systems vulnerability to a kind of
selfish mining [15] where the leader of the current round will
hide some micro blocks and mine on a hidden micro block
privately.
Longest chain extension: In Bitcoin-NG, the transaction
fees contained in the micro blocks are split to the two leaders:
a fraction α of the transaction fees is released to the leader of
the current round and a fraction 1−α of the transaction fees is
rewarded to the leader of the next round, as shown in Fig. 2.
5This is different from the incentive mechanism of Bitcoin that
rewards the current leader with all transaction fees contained
in the current block. This incentive mechanism of Bitcoin-NG
can encourage miners to extend the longest chain.
Suppose that all transaction fees contained in these micro
blocks will be rewarded to the current leader. To earn more
revenue, a malicious miner may deliberately discard the latest
published micro block and mine on an earlier published micro
block. If this miner succeeds in doing that, he will pack the
transactions of the discarded micro block into his own micro
blocks to get all transaction fees. Splitting the transaction fees
into two parts can incentivize miners to mine on the longest
chain that contains the already published micro blocks, since
to become the next leader can still earn transaction fees from
these micro blocks.
However, even with this incentive mechanism, it is still
possible that miners can earn more revenue by deliberately
discarding the latest published micro block and mining on
an earlier published micro block. The more possible revenue
can be achieved using the following mining strategy. If one
miner succeeds in mining the one key block, he will then pack
the transactions (that contained in the previous micro block
discarded by her/him) into his own micro block and continue
to mine on the next key block. Hence, the value of α should be
designed such that the revenue of the leader taking this mining
strategy must be smaller than his/her revenue of expanding the
longest chain [12].
Transaction inclusion: Moreover, the value of parameter
α should be chosen to motivate the current leader to spon-
taneously pack transactions into its published micro block.
Since the transaction fees are split to the current leader and the
next leader, the current leader has a general incentive to pack
transactions into a hidden micro block and mine on the hidden
micro block to potentially obtain 100% of the transaction fees.
The value of α should to be chosen such that the leader’s
revenue of withholding the micro block must be smaller than
his revenue of abiding by the protocol [12].
Considering the above possible malicious mining behaviors,
the value of α is suggested to α = 0.4 by the incentive
mechanism in the original design of Bitcoin-NG [12]. How-
ever, the analysis on the incentive mechanism of Bitcoin-
NG is flawed. Ref. [17] points out that there is a negligence
and an over-simplification on the original analysis of Bitcoin-
NG incentive mechanism, and it corrects the optimal value
of α as α = 3/11. Ref. [18] investigates the incentive
mechanism of Bitcoin-NG by considering the selfish mining
of key blocks and micro blocks jointly. In this work, we reveal
that besides the above discussed malicious mining behaviors
that are solved by the incentive mechanism of Bitcoin-NG,
there still exists a possible malicious mining behavior in the
Bitcoin-NG network.
IV. GAME-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF BITCOIN-NG
MINING
In this section, we study a new identified mali-
cious mining—advanced mining attack—for Bitcoin-NG
blockchain.
A. One-Attacker Mining Optimization
First, we consider the scenario where an attacker can change
its mining-duration length to perform advanced mining attack
to other honest miners who follow the rule of mining in a fixed
default duration. We formulate the advanced mining attack
problem as an optimization problem for the attacker to find
the optimal length of the mining duration that maximizes the
attacker’s revenue.
It is theoretically shown in [9] that blockchain protocols can
achieve optimal transaction throughputs by decoupling each
block into two kinds of blocks where one is used for selecting
the leader and the other is used for recording transactions.
In [9], such decouple is achieved by setting different mining
targets: the mining target of blocks for recording transactions
is smaller than that of blocks for selecting leaders. Bitcoin-
NG is a special implementation of such blockchain protocol,
i.e., Bitcoin-NG assigns mining target T (d) = 2L−d to key
blocks and no mining target to micro blocks. The mining target
T (d) = 2L−d is determined by the difficult control that aims
to maintain the average interval between two consecutive key
blocks at a constant value.
After the key block of the current round is published, the
leader broadcasts consecutive micro blocks to the network
within a duration of length Tb. Following the latest micro
block, miners try to compute the next key block. We denote
Tm as the length of the duration between the last micro block
of this round and the key block of the next round, and assume
that all the honest miners adopt this duration as the default
mining duration. Therefore, the length of the interval between
two adjacent key blocks is given by T = Tb + Tm. Since Tm is
the length of the default mining duration, the difficulty control
of Bitcoin-NG is made with respect to Tm, i.e., by adjusting
the difficult level d to maintain (Tm/2
d)
∑N
n=1 wn = 1. With
this design of difficult control for Bitcoin-NG, we can fix
the average interval between two adjacent key blocks to a
constant.1
Although the default mining duration is preset, miners still
can freely decide when to begin their mining due to the
decentralized nature of the system. On one hand, since 1− α
of the transaction fees contained in the micro blocks of this
round are distributed to the next leader, miners generally turn
to mine on the latest published micro block to earn transaction
fees as many as possible. On the other hand, if miners choose
to mine on an early micro block, they will lose a part of the
transaction fees but have more time to make more hash queries
for computing the nonce. The greater number of nonces being
tried admits a higher probability of finding the correct nonce.
If an early miner succeeds to find the next key block earlier
than other miners, the lost transaction fee can be compensated
1In the original Bitcoin-NG protocol that follows the security designs of
Bitcoin, the difficulty control is made with respect to T ; and all miners mine
immediately after the key block; then after each micro block is published by
the current leader, all miners change to mine on the new micro block (like
mining a new block in Bitcoin). However, this design of Bitcoin-NG cannot
fix the average interval between two adjacent key blocks to a constant. This is
because that when miners change to mine on a new micro block, the mining
process of the next key block is restarted due to that the mining poison process
is memoryless; then, the average time between this micro block and the next
successful mined key block is still T .
6by the reward of the new coins mint in the next key block.
Therefore, the possible revenue motivates miners to mine on
an early micro block. We refer to such mining strategy as
advanced mining attack.
We now consider that there is one attacker making advanced
mining attack in the Bitcoin-NG network. During the interval
between the current key block and the next key block, this
attacker uses the last duration of length τ to compute the
next key block, where τ > Tm. Without loss of generality,
we group all other miners in the network as a single honest
miner, who uses the last duration of length Tm to compute the
next key block according to the default mining rule. In Fig.
2, we illustrate the relationship among the variables of T , Tb,
Tm and τ defined above. Let wA denote the hash rate of the
attacker, and wB denote the hash rate of the honest miner. If
the perfect difficulty control with respect to Tm is achieved,
we have Tm(wA + wB)/2
d = 1.
Actually, the attacker and the honest miner devote their
computation powers to perform a mining race: the one who
computes a valid nonce earlier than the other is the winner.
The winner will be the leader of the next round and can earn
the corresponding rewards. Therefore, devoting more compu-
tation resources (i.e., longer mining duration) can increase the
winning chance. We denote the probability that the attacker
wins the mining race by a function of the length of its mining
duration τ , P (τ). Note that P (τ) is monotonically increasing
with respect to τ , indicating that the attacker achieves a higher
wining probability when a longer mining duration is devoted.
We denote the lengths of the mining duration needed for
successful mining of the attacker and the honest miner as ran-
dom variablesXA andXB , respectively. The random variables
XA and XB are independent and both fulfill the exponential
distribution with rates λA
∆
= wA/2
d and λB
∆
= wB/2
d [14].
Hence, the winning probability P (τ) of the attacker is given
by
P (τ) = Pr (XA − τ < XB − Tm)
= Pr (XA −XB < τ − Tm)
(5)
where XA − τ and XB − Tm are the time instances when
the attacker and the honest miner successfully find the next
key block. Since the difference between two independent
exponential distributed random variables, e.g., XA −XB , is a
Laplace distributed random variable, the probability expressed
in (5) can be calculated as [17]:
P (τ) = 1−
λB
λA + λB
e−(τ−Tm)λA (6)
If we consider that there is no advanced mining attack, i.e.,
τ = Tm, the probability in (6) is reduced to P (τ = Tm) =
λA/(λA + λB), which is the successful probability of honest
mining that equals the ratio of the miner’s computation power
over the totally computation power of the network [10].
We assume that each key block contains a reward R (i.e., the
value of the mint coins), each micro block contains a reward r
(i.e., the value of the transaction fees), and the current leader
can generate L micro blocks after its key block Ki within
the duration of length Tb. If the advanced mining attacker
can mine the next key block Ki+1, it can earn the transac-
tion fees from the first L (T − τ )/Tb micro blocks, where
L (T − τ )/Tb < L since T − τ < Tb. Therefore, after the
key block Ki+1 is published by the attacker, the total reward
obtained by the attacker in the last block interval includes both
the rewards from the new key block Ki+1 and the rewards
from the micro blocks
{
Mi,1,Mi,2, · · · ,Mi,L(T−τ)/Tb
}
that
are included onto the blockchain. When computing the total
reward for the attacker, we consider two different situations:
1) the previous key block Ki is mined by the honest miner
(i.e., Ki ∈ Bhonest); 2) the previous key block Ki is mined by
the attacker (i.e., Ki ∈ Battacker), where Battacker (Bhonest)
is the set of the key blocks mined by the attacker (honest
miners).
We first consider that the previous key blockKi is mined by
the honest miner (Ki ∈ Bhonest). If the attacker can succeed to
find the next key block Ki+1, the total reward of the attacker
includes both the rewards from the new key block and the
(1− α)-fraction of the rewards from the micro blocks, i.e.,
the total reward is given by:
Q (τ) = (1− α) rL
T − τ
Tb
+R (7)
which is also a function of its mining-duration length. The
expected reward of the attacker (denoted by pi (τ)) is the total
revenue when its mining is successful Q (τ) multiplied by the
probability of successful mining P (τ):
pi (τ) = Q (τ)P (τ)
=
(
(1− α) rL
T − τ
Tb
+R
)(
1−
λB
λA + λB
e−(τ−Tm)λA
)
(8)
The reward function pi (τ) is concave and continuous in τ ,
and we can obtain the maximum value of pi (τ) when
dpi(τ)
dτ
= 0 (9)
Solving (9), we find that the reward function pi (τ) achieves
its maximum value at
τ∗ =
R
(1−α)rLλATb + λAT + 1−W
(
1
1−λATm
e(
R
(1−α)rL+1)λATb+1
)
λA
(10)
where W (·) denotes the Lambert W Function [19].
We then consider that the previous key block Ki is also
mined by the attacker (Ki ∈ Battacker). Now, if the attacker
can succeed to find the next key block Ki+1, the total reward
of the miner includes both the rewards from the new key block
and all the rewards from the micro blocks:
Q (τ) = rL
T − τ
Tb
+R (11)
Following the same way, we can compute the optimal mining
length that achieves the maximum mining reward as:
τ∗ =
R
rL
λATb + λAT + 1−W
(
1
1−λATm
e(
R
rL
+1)λATb+1
)
λA
(12)
According to whether the previous key block is mined by the
attacker, the attacker can choose its optimal mining length
τ∗ according to (10) or (12). In Section V, we numerically
7compute the corresponding maximum expected reward pi (τ∗)
that is showed to be larger than the expected reward earned
by the honest mining pi (Tm). The result indicates that when
all other miners adopt honest mining, the attacker’s advanced
mining over the last duration τ∗ > Tm of the block interval
is the optimal strategy to earn the highest expected reward.
B. Two-Player Mining Game
We next proceed to analyze the scenario where all miners
in the network are divided into two mining pools that both try
to make advanced mining attack (i.e., changing their mining-
duration lengths) and thus compete with each other. We will
see that this setup leads to a game-theoretical model and we
derive the Nash equilibrium mining strategies for the two
mining pools. We denote the two mining pools as pool A
and pool B with hash rates wA and wB , respectively. Pool A
(B) attempts to carry out advanced mining using the mining
duration of length τA (τB). The mining behaviors of the two
pools in this scenario can be analyzed through a two-player
game.
We formulate the two-pool advanced mining problem as
a two-player game as follows. The two players, pool A and
pool B, strategically choose their mining-duration lengths to
compete for the reward of successful mining. The two mining
pools are rational and their interaction can be modeled as
a non-cooperative game [20]. Each pool has a set of pure
strategies in S = [Tm, T ]. Let τn ∈ S be the mining strategy
of pool n, where n ∈ {A,B}. A two-tuple of strategies of
the two mining pools is τ = (τA, τB) and a two-tuple of
corresponding payoffs is pi = (piA (τ) , piB (τ)), where pin (τ)
is the utility of player n given the chosen strategies of the two
mining pools. Each mining pool chooses its best strategy τ∗n
to maximize its utility. A set of strategies τ∗ = (τ∗A, τ
∗
B) is
the Nash equilibrium if no miner can gain higher utility by
unilaterally changing its own strategy when the strategies of
the other miners remain unchanged, i.e.,
∀τ = (τA, τB) ∈ S×S :
{
piA (τ
∗
A, τ
∗
B) ≥ piA (τA, τ
∗
B)
piB (τ
∗
A, τ
∗
B) ≥ piB (τ
∗
A, τB)
(13)
The inequalities in (13) defines the equilibrium state of the
game. At the Nash equilibrium if it exists, the players have
no incentive to deviate from their equilibrium strategies.
For the advanced mining problem, we adopt the expected
mining rewards as the utilities in the game formulation. We
compute the utilities as follows. After the two mining pools
have successful mined the next key block Ki+1, their rewards
are 

QA (τA) = (1− α) rL
T − τA
Tb
+R
QB (τB) = rL
T − τB
Tb
+R
(14)
if the previous block Ki is mined by mining pool B (Ki ∈
BB), or 

QA (τA) = rL
T − τA
Tb
+R
QB (τB) = (1− α) rL
T − τB
Tb
+R
(15)
if the previous block Ki is mined by mining pool A (Ki ∈
BA).
Only if the time instance for a pool finding a nonce is
earlier than the time instance for its opponent does, that
mining pool can earn the reward. Since the mining pools both
can change the lengths of their mining duration, τA and τB ,
the successful mining probability of pool n is a function of
mining-duration lengths of both pools, i.e., τ = (τA, τB). We
write the successful mining probabilities of pool A and pool
B as follows

PA (τ) = Pr (XA − τA < XB − τB)
= Pr (XA −XB < τA − τB)
PB (τ) = Pr (XB − τB < XA − τA)
= Pr (XB −XA < τB − τA)
(16)
where XA and XB are the random variables representing
the lengths of the mining duration needed for the successful
mining of mining pools A and B, respectively. We find that
the computation of probabilities PA (τ) and PB (τ) depends
on the sign of τA − τB , and thus we can analyze the cases of
τA − τB < 0 and τA − τB > 0, respectively.
We derive the Nash equilibrium for the two-player mining
game when τA − τB < 0 in the following. The differences
of two independent exponential distributed random variables,
XA − XB , are Laplace distributed. When τA − τB < 0, the
probabilities PA (τ) and PB (τ) in (16) can be computed as:

PA (τ) =
λA
λA + λB
e(τA−τB)λB
PB (τ) = 1−
λA
λA + λB
e−(τB−τA)λB
(17)
where λA = wA/2
d and λB = wB/2
d.
We assume that the previous block Ki is mined by mining
pool B (Ki ∈ BB). Using (14) and (17), the utilities of the
two players (i.e., their expected mining rewards) are given by

piA (τ) = QA (τA)PA (τ)
= ((1− α) rL
T − τA
Tb
+R)
λA
λA + λB
e(τA−τB)λB
piB (τ) = QB (τB)PB (τ)
= (rL
T − τB
Tb
+R)(1−
λA
λA + λB
e(τA−τB)λB )
(18)
The utilities piA (τ) and piB (τ) are concave and continuous
in τA and τB , and thus the Nash equilibrium must satisfy the
condition {
∂piA (τA, τB)
∂τA
= 0,
∂piB (τA, τB)
∂τB
= 0
}
(19)
Solving (19), we obtain the Nash equilibrium for the two-
player mining game when τA − τB < 0 and Ki ∈ BB:

τ∗A = T +
R
(1−α)rLTb −
1
λA
τ∗B =
R
rL
λBTb+λBT+1−W
(
1
1−λBTm
e
2− R
rL
λBTb
α
1−α
)
λB
(20)
where we have used the difficulty control result
Tm (λA + λB) = 1. Similarly, when τA − τB < 0 and the
8previous block Ki is mined by mining pool A (Ki ∈ BA),
the Nash equilibrium for the two-player mining game is:


τ∗A = T +
R
rL
Tb −
1
λB
τ∗B =
R
(1−α)rL
λBTb+λBT+1−W
(
1
1−λBTm
e
2+ R
rL
λBTb
α
1−α
)
λB
(21)
For the case of τA − τB > 0, the derivation for the Nash
equilibrium is similar to the case of τA − τB < 0. We omit it
here to save space. The mining lengths achieved at the Nash
equilibrium indicate that for all cases, the two mining pools
will deviate from mining with the default mining-duration
length.
C. N -Player Mining Game
We finally extend the two-player mining game to a N -player
mining game. We consider that the miners in the network are
grouped into N mining pools and all mining pools execute
advanced mining. Mining pool n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} with hash
rates wn uses the mining duration of length τn to carry out
advanced mining. The mining behaviors of the N pools can
also be modeled as a non-cooperative game.
In the N -player game, all N mining pools strategically
choose the lengths of their mining duration to maximize
their revenue. Each pool n has a set of pure strategies
S = [Tm, T ] . Let τn ∈ S be the strategy of mining
pool n. The vector of the strategies of N mining pools is
τ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τN ) , and the vector of the corresponding
utilities is pi = (pi1 (τ) , pi2 (τ) , · · · , piN (τ)), where pin (τ)
is the utility of player n given the chosen strategies of the
N mining pools. Each mining pool chooses its best strat-
egy τ∗n to maximize its utility. The vector of the strategies
τ∗ = (τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 , · · · , τ
∗
N ) is the Nash equilibrium if no mining
pool can gain higher utility by changing its own strategy when
the strategies of the other miners remain unchanged, i.e.,
∀n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} , ∀τn ∈ S : pin (τ
∗
n, τ¯
∗
n) ≥ pin (τn, τ¯
∗
n)
(22)
where τ¯∗n = (τ
∗
1 , · · · , τ
∗
n−1, τ
∗
n+1 · · · , τ
∗
N ) is the vector of the
best strategies of the other N − 1 mining pools except mining
pool n.
Then we compute the utility of pool n in this game as
follows. When we compute it, we assume the previous key
block Ki is mined by the mining pool N (the results for other
N − 1 cases can be obtained similarly). If mining pool n
succeeds to find the next key block Ki+1 via advanced mining
with mining duration of length τn, its reward is given by
Qn (τn) =
{
(1− α) rLT−τn
Tb
+ R, n = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1
rLT−τn
Tb
+R, n = N
(23)
Since the successful mining probability of mining pool n
is impacted not only by its own strategy but also other
competitors’ strategies, it can be written as a function of
τ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τN ) and computed as
Pn (τ)
= Pr (Xn − τn < X1 − τ1, · · · , Xn − τn < Xn−1 − τn−1,
Xn − τn < Xn+1 − τn+1, · · · , Xn − τn < XN − τN )
=
∏
m∈{1,···n−1,n+1,··· ,N}
Pr (Xn −Xm < τn − τm)
(24)
whereXn is the random variable representing the length of the
mining duration needed for the successful mining of pool n.
To compute the probabilities Pn (τ) for all n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
according to (24), we need to consider
(
N
2
)
cases for
the signs of {τn − τm, n = 1, · · · , N,m = n+ 1, · · · , N}.
For example, considering the case of N = 3 and
{τ1 − τ2 < 0, τ1 − τ3 < 0, τ2 − τ3 < 0}, we have

P1 (τ) = Pr (X1 −X2 < τ1 − τ2) Pr (X1 −X3 < τ1 − τ3)
=
(
λ1
λ1 + λ2
e(τ1−τ2)λ2
)(
λ1
λ1 + λ3
e(τ1−τ3)λ3
)
P2 (τ) = Pr (X2 −X1 < τ2 − τ1) Pr (X2 −X3 < τ2 − τ3)
=
(
1−
λ1
λ1 + λ2
e(τ1−τ2)λ2
)(
λ2
λ2 + λ3
e(τ2−τ3)λ3
)
P3 (τ) = Pr (X3 −X1 < τ3 − τ1) Pr (X3 −X2 < τ3 − τ2)
=
(
1−
λ1
λ1 + λ3
e(τ1−τ3)λ3
)(
1−
λ2
λ2 + λ3
e(τ2−τ3)λ3
)
(25)
Using (23) and (24), the utility of mining pool n can be
expressed as
pin (τ) = Qn (τn)Pn (τ) (26)
for all n. Then, we can find the Nash equilibrium τ∗ =
(τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 , · · · , τ
∗
N ) by solving the equation system{
∂pi1 (τ)
∂τ1
= 0, · · · ,
∂pin (τ)
∂τn
= 0, · · · ,
∂piN (τ)
∂τN
= 0
}
(27)
We can find that the utility functions showed in (18) for the
two-player game and in (26) for the N -player game are all
strictly concave. Therefore, we can conclude that the Nash
equilibrium achieved in the advanced mining game is unique
[21]. However, we cannot derive the explicit form of the Nash
equilibrium for the N -player game. In the next section, we will
solve the Nash equilibrium in different cases using numerical
computations.
V. NUMERICAL COMPUTATIONS AND SYSTEM
SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present the results of numerical com-
putations and system simulations to investigate the advanced
mining problem for the Bitcoin-NG protocol.
A. Numerical Computations
We first numerically compute the analytical results provided
in section IV. In our numerical computations and simulations,
we set T = 10, Tm = 2, L = 10, α = 3/11, r = 1 and
R ∈ {1, 5, 10}.
9We first numerically analyze the one-attacker mining op-
timization problem. We compute the expected reward of the
attacker pi (τ) that is a function of the length of the mining
duration τ , given the mining power λA as the parameter. Note
that since Tm = 2, we have λA+λB = 1/Tm = 0.5. Fig. 3 (a)
presents the reward functions for the case of Ki−1 ∈ Bhonest;
and Fig. 3 (b) presents the reward function for the case of
Ki ∈ Battacker . We set to R = 10 when computing the
expected reward. For a specific mining power, each red round
represents the maximum expected reward achieved by the
corresponding optimal mining-duration length τ∗ expressed
in (10) for Ki ∈ Bhonest and in (12) for Ki ∈ Battacker ;
each black square represents the expected reward achieved by
the default mining-duration length Tm. From Fig. 3, we can
see that higher mining powers decrease the required mining-
duration lengths to achieve the maximum expected rewards.
Intuitively, higher mining powers increase the probabilities of
finding a key block, thus the attacker can mine slightly later
and wait for more micro blocks to earn more transaction fees.
Higher mining power also increase the maximum expected
reward of the attacker. It is also observed that the optimal
mining-duration length forKi ∈ Bhonest is larger than that for
Ki ∈ Battacker . Since if the previous key block is mined by
the attacker (Ki ∈ Battacker), the attacker is prone to include
more micro blocks onto blockchain to earn the transaction fees
and thus it reduces its mining-duration length. Moreover, we
can observe that, whatever is the mining power, the maximum
expected reward achieved by advanced mining is higher than
that achieved by honest mining.
For this one-attacker scenario, we also compare the ad-
vanced mining attack with the block withhold (BWH) attack
with power splitting [22]. BHW attack with power splitting
for Bitcoin aims at gaining higher mining rewards by splitting
the mining power of the attacker pool into multiple subparts
and using some subparts to cancel the mining powers of
other mining pools and some subparts to mine for itself.
For comparison purpose, we apply BHW attack with power
splitting to Bitcoin-NG. The BWH attacker adopts the optimal
power splitting strategy derived in [22] for attacking and fixes
its mining length to the default length Tm. We can compute the
expected rewards achieved by BHW attack according to the
result given in [22]. In Fig. 3, each blue triangle represents the
expected reward achieved by BWH attack for a specific mining
power. We can observe that the achieved expected rewards of
BHW attack are indeed higher than that of honest mining; the
maximum expected rewards achieved by advanced mining are
higher than that achieved by BWH attack. This indicates that
in Bitcoin-NG blockchain, advanced mining attack is more
effective than BWH attack.
We then investigate the two-player mining game. We com-
pute the optimal mining strategies (i.e., the optimal mining-
duration lengths derived in Section IV.B). Fig. 4 depicts the
optimal mining-duration lengths of the two mining pools that
are given as the functions of pool A’s mining power for
R = 1, 5, 10, respectively. We can see that when λA < λB , the
optimal mining length of pool A is larger than that of pool
B. This fulfills the intuition that to achieve an equilibrium,
the mining pool with less mining power needs to mine earlier
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Fig. 3: The expected reward of the attacker pi (τ) in the
one-attacker mining optimization problem are given as the
functions of the mining-duration length τ .
to enlarge its successful mining probability. The situation is
the same for the case of λA > λB . When we increase the
reward of mint coins contained in key blocks (i.e. we increase
R), we observe that the optimal mining-duration lengths of
the two pools approach T = 10 for many parts of the mining
power profile. This is because that large R encourages mining
in advance to earn the reward of mint coins in key blocks.
We finally numerically compute the optimal mining-
duration lengths for the N -player mining game by setting
N = 3 (i.e., we have three mining pools denoted by A, B
and C). When we do that, we fix the mining power of the
mining pool B λB , and vary the mining power of mining
pool A λA. For a given λB , the computed optimal mining-
duration lengths are functions of λA. The results are shown
in Fig. 5 when λB = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} and R = 1. We can
see that for different power mining profiles, the mining pools
need to employ different mining-duration lengths to achieve
the equilibrium; mining pools with larger mining powers will
converge to using shorter mining-duration lengths.
We conduct system simulations to investigate the advanced
mining problem in the Bitcoin-NG network. Following the
simulation approach used in [15] for Bitcoin-like systems, we
constructed a simulator that captures all the relevant Bitcoin-
NG network details described in the previous sections, except
that the crypto puzzle solving processing was replaced by a
Monte Carlo simulator that simulates the time required for
block discovery without actually attempting to compute a
hash function. We simulated 210 miners mining at identical
rates (i.e., they each can have one simulated hash test at each
time step of the Monte Carlo simulations and each test is a
successful mining with probability 2−d). The total hash rate of
the whole network thus is 210. The difficulty level d is set to
ensure that in average one key block is found by the network
during the mining time Tm = 2, i.e.,
(
210
/
2d
)
Tm = 1 which
gives d = 11.
The first simulation is to investigate the one-attacker min-
ing optimization problem. In the simulation, the attacker’
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Fig. 4: The optimal mining-duration lengths of the two mining pools in the mining game model are given as functions of the
mining power λA (R = {1, 5, 10}).
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Fig. 5: The optimal mining-duration lengths of the three
mining pools are given as the functions of the mining power
λA for λB = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}.
mining pool includes ωA miners (thus its hash ratio is
λA = ωA
/
2d ∈ [0, 0.5]); the honest mining pool includes
the remaining 210 − ωA miners (thus its hash ratio is λB =(
210 − ωA
)/
2d = 0.5 − λA). The reward contained in each
key block is set to as R = {1, 10}. The simulation results
are given in Fig. 6 (a) for the average mining reward of the
attacker and in Fig. 6 (b) for the frequency of mining success
of the attacker. The hash ratio of the attacker is treated as
a parameter and is set to as λA = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}. The
averaging is performed over 1000 rounds. From Fig. 6 (a), we
can see that for different hash ratios of the attacker, the attacker
can get more profits by performing advanced mining than by
performing honest mining; the gain of advanced mining over
honest mining gets large, as the reward contain in key blocks
R gets large; the gain gets small, as the attacker’s hash ratio
λA gets large. From Fig. 6 (b), we can see that compared to
having honest mining, the attacker increase its frequency of
mining success by having advanced mining; the attacker with
less computation power (smaller hash ratio) can increase more
its frequency of mining success, compared to the attacker with
higher computation power.
The second simulation is to investigate the two-player
mining game problem, where mining pools A and B com-
pete with each other using advanced mining. Similarly, the
mining pool A includes ωA miners (thus its hash ratio is
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Fig. 6: The simulation results for the one-attacker mining
optimization problem: (a) the average mining reward of the
attacker); (b) the frequency of mining success of the attacker.
λA = ωA
/
2d ∈ [0, 0.5]); the mining pool B includes the
remaining 210 − ωA miners (thus its hash ratio is λB =(
210 − ωA
)/
2d = 0.5 − λA). We investigate the following
four setups of mining strategies:
i) (τ∗A, τ
∗
B): both pools adopt advanced mining with their
optimal mining-duration lengths given by the Nash equi-
librium;
ii) (Tm, Tm): both pools adopt honest mining with the
default mining-duration lengths;
iii) (τ∗A, Tm): pool A adopts advanced mining with its op-
timal mining-duration length given by the Nash equi-
librium and pool B adopts honest mining with default
mining-duration length;
iv) (Tm, τ
∗
B): pool A adopts honest mining with default
mining-duration length and pool B adopts advanced
mining with its optimal mining-duration length given by
the Nash equilibrium.
The simulation results for the two mining pools under the
above four setups of mining strategies are given in Fig. 7-8.
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Fig. 7: The simulation results of the average mining reward
for the two-player mining game when R = 10.
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Fig. 8: The simulation results of the frequency of mining
success for the two-player mining game when R = 10.
Under parameters λA = {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} and R = 10, the
average mining rewards of the two mining pools are shown
in Fig. 7, and the frequency of mining success of the two
mining pools are shown in Fig. 8. We see from Fig. 7 that the
average mining rewards of the two mining pools with mining
strategies (τ∗A, τ
∗
B) are lower than that when mining strategies
(Tm, Tm) are adopted. If one pool deviates from advanced
mining to honest mining, its average reward decreases when
the other pool sticks to the advanced mining strategies. From
the results in Fig. 8, we see that when the mining strategy of
the other mining pool is fixed, the frequency of mining success
of one particular mining pool is increased by its own advanced
mining. Therefore, we conclude that both of the mining pools
have no motivation to have honest mining due to their selfish
and non-cooperative nature. From Fig. 8, we also find that a
mining pool with less computation power (i.e., smaller hash
ratio) has a higher motivation to perform advanced mining,
since the advanced mining can increase its frequency of mining
success regardless of what mining strategies the other mining
pool adopts.
Fig. 9 presents the sum and individual average mining
rewards of mining pools A and B that both adopt advanced
mining ((τ∗A, τ
∗
B)) and or honest mining ( (Tm, Tm)) for R = 1
and R = 10. For a particular setup of hash ratios, , e.g., λA and
λB = 0.5−λA, there is a difference between the sum reward
of the pools both having advanced mining (τ∗A, τ
∗
B), and the
sum reward of the pools both having honest mining (Tm, Tm).
This difference in the sum rewards of the two mining pools is
a system penalty caused by advanced mining. This penalty
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Fig. 9: The simulation results of the sum average mining
rewards of the two mining pools both adopting advanced
mining and both adopting honest mining: (a) R = 1; (b)
R = 10.
is in accordance with the reduced TPS—it is the number
of the micro blocks that are not included in the blockchain.
Comparing the average mining reward results in Fig. 9 (a) (for
R = 1) and in Fig. 9 (b) (for R = 10), we can also see that the
penalty caused by advanced mining increases as the increase
of R.
Based on the observations, we can conclude: the advanced
mining strategy setup (τ∗A, τ
∗
B) is indeed the equilibrium of
the mining game problem; advanced mining is harmful to
the Bitcoin-NG network and it reduces the TPS of Bitcoin-
NG; the TPS penalty caused by advanced mining decreases
as the decrease of the reward contained in each key block
(R). Therefore, if the total volume of the issued coins by
Bitcoin-NG blockchain is fixed, releasing a small amount of
new coins in each key block and letting the issue of coins
last for a long time can alleviate the negative impact of
advanced mining. Although zero key block reward can reduce
the negative impact of advanced mining to the lowest, it will
cause the blockchain unstable [23].
We investigate the mining game of N -players by consider-
ing the scenario where three mining pools A, B and C (i.e.
N = 3) play the mining game. In the simulation, the three
mining pools have hash ratios λA = 0.25, λB = 0.1, and
λC = 0.15, respectively. We consider three setups of mining
strategies for them: i) all three mining pools adopt advanced
mining ((τ∗A, τ
∗
B , τ
∗
C)); ii) all three mining pools adopt honest
mining ((Tm, Tm, Tm)); iii) mining pool A adopts advanced
mining and the other two adopt honest mining ((τ∗A, Tm, Tm)),
where τ∗A, τ
∗
B , and τ
∗
C are the optimal mining-duration lengths
given by the Nash equilibrium. The simulation results are
given in Fig. 10 when R = 10, where Fig. 10 (a) presents
the results of the average mining reward, and Fig. 10 (b)
presents the results of the frequency of mining success. From
the simulation results, we can see that for the mining game
where N = 3, the best strategy of a particular player (e.g.,
mining pool A) is advanced mining. This validates the Nash
equilibrium for the mining game where N = 3.
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Fig. 10: The simulation results for the three-player mining
game when λA = 0.25, λB = 0.1, λC = 0.15, R = 10: (a) the
average mining reward; (b) the frequency of mining success.
We also compare advanced mining attack with BHW attack
[22] in the three-player scenario. For the game-theoretical
model of BHW attack, we assume that the mining pools B
and C can access the mining pool A to adopt the optimal
power-splitting strategies proposed in [22] to play the mining
game. The simulation results of the BHW attack game are
presented in Fig. 10. We can observe that in the simulated
three-player scenario, the BHW attack game gives less severe
attack effects than the advanced mining game dose, i.e, the
advanced mining game changes the distribution of mining
rewards more severely.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigated the advanced mining problem
for the Bitcoin-NG blockchain protocol. Although Bitcoin-
NG is scalable, it is vulnerable to the malicious advanced
mining in which attackers intentionally ignore some micro
blocks issued by the current leader and mine on a early micro
block to enlarge their successful mining probabilities. We find
that although advanced mining will lose some transaction
fees contained in later micro blocks, it is still more profit
than honest mining (i.e., mining on the latest micro block).
Moreover, we show that when mining pools adopt advanced
mining, the mining problem of Bitcoin-NG can be formulated
as a non-cooperative game and each mining pool individually
decides when to mine. We then find the equilibrium of this
mining game. Numerical results are provided to confirm our
analytical results. We have performed system simulations
to investigate the advanced mining problem. Based on the
simulation results, we have the following conclusions: the
analytically derived advanced mining strategy is indeed the
equilibrium of the mining game; advanced mining will reduce
the TPS of Bitcoin-NG; mining pools with less computation
power have higher motivations to perform advanced mining.
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